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Abstract—We open source an easy to assemble, spoof resistant, high resolution, optical fingerprint reader, called RaspiReader, using
ubiquitous components. By using our open source STL files and software, RaspiReader can be built in under one hour for only US
$175. As such, RaspiReader provides the fingerprint research community a seamless and simple method for quickly prototyping new
ideas involving fingerprint reader hardware. In particular, we posit that this open source fingerprint reader will facilitate the exploration
of novel fingerprint spoof detection techniques involving both hardware and software. We demonstrate one such spoof detection
technique by specially customizing RaspiReader with two cameras for fingerprint image acquisition. One camera provides high
contrast, frustrated total internal reflection (FTIR) fingerprint images, and the other outputs direct images of the finger in contact with
the platen. Using both of these image streams, we extract complementary information which, when fused together and used for spoof
detection, results in marked performance improvement over previous methods relying only on grayscale FTIR images provided by
COTS optical readers. Finally, fingerprint matching experiments between images acquired from the FTIR output of RaspiReader and
images acquired from a COTS reader verify the interoperability of the RaspiReader with existing COTS optical readers.
Index Terms—Raspberry Pi, Frustrated Total Internal Reflection (FTIR), Open Source Fingerprint Readers, Presentation Attack
Detection, Spoof Detection, Interoperability
F
1 INTRODUCTION
ONE of the major challenges facing biometric technologytoday is the growing threat of presentation attacks1 [2].
The most common type of presentation attack (referred to
as spoofing) occurs when a hacker intentionally assumes
the identity of unsuspecting individuals, called victims here,
through stealing their fingerprints, fabricating spoofs with
the stolen fingerprints, and maliciously attacking fingerprint
recognition systems with the spoofs into identifying the
hacker as the victim2 [3], [4], [5], [6].
The need to prevent spoof attacks is becoming increas-
ingly urgent due to the monumental costs and loss of
user privacy associated with spoofed systems. Consider
for example India’s Aadhaar program which (i) provides
benefits and services to an ever growing population of
over 1.2 billion residents through fingerprint and/or iris
recognition [7], [8] and (ii) facilitates electronic financial
transactions through the Unified Payments Interface (UPI)
[9]. Failure to detect spoof attacks in the Aadhaar system
could cause the disruption of a commerce system affecting
untold numbers of people. Also consider the United States
Office of Biometric Identity Management (US OBIM) which
is responsible for supporting the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) with biometric identification services specif-
ically aimed at preventing people who pose security risks to
the United States from entering the country [10]. Failure to
detect spoofs on systems deployed by OBIM could result in
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1. In ISO standard IEC 30107-1:2016(E), presentation attacks are de-
fined as the “presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the
goal of interfering with the operation of the biometric system” [1].
2. Presentation attacks can also occur when (i) two individuals are in
collusion or (ii) an individual obfuscates his or her own fingerprints to
avoid recognition [3]. However, in this paper our specific aim is to stop
fingerprint spoofing presentation attacks.
Fig. 1. Prototype of RaspiReader: two fingerprint images (b, (i)) and
(b, (ii)) of the input finger (a) are captured. The raw direct image (b,
(i)) and the raw, high contrast FTIR image (b, (ii)) both contain useful
information for spoof detection. Following the use of (b, (ii)) for spoof
detection, image calibration and processing are performed on the raw
FTIR image to output a high quality, 500 ppi fingerprint for matching (b,
(iii)). The dimensions of the RaspiReader shown in (a) are 100 mm x
100 mm x 105 mm (about the size of a 4 inch cube).
a deadly terrorist attack3. Finally, almost all of us are actively
carrying fingerprint recognition systems embedded within
our personal smart devices. Failure to detect spoof attacks
on smartphones [12] could compromise emails, banking
information, social media content, personal photos and a
plethora of other confidential information.
In an effort to mitigate the costs associated with spoof
attacks, a number of spoof detection techniques involving
3. In 2012, a journalist successfully demonstrated that the Hong
Kong-China border control system could be easily spoofed [11].
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2Fig. 2. Fingerprint images acquired using the RaspiReader. Images in (a) were collected from a live finger. Images in (b) were collected from a
spoof finger. Using features extracted from both raw image outputs ((i), direct) and ((ii), FTIR) of the RaspiReader, our spoof detectors are better
able to discriminate between live fingers and spoof fingers. The raw FTIR image output of the RaspiReader (ii) can be post processed (after spoof
detection) to output images suitable for fingerprint matching. Images in (c) were acquired from the same live finger (a) and spoof finger (b) on a
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 500 ppi optical reader. The close similarity between the two images in (c) qualitatively illustrates why current spoof
detectors are limited by the low information content, processed fingerprint images (c, (iii)) output by COTS readers.
both hardware and software have been proposed in the
literature. Special hardware embedded in fingerprint read-
ers4 enables capture of features such as heartbeat, thermal
output, blood flow, odor, and sub-dermal finger character-
istics useful for distinguishing a live finger from a spoof
[3], [13], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. Spoof detection
methods in software are based on extracting textural [22],
[23], [24], [25], [26], anatomical [27], and physiological [28],
[29] features from processed5 fingerprint images which are
used in conjunction with a classifier such as Support Vec-
tor Machines (SVM). Alternatively, a Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) can be trained to distinguish a live finger
from a spoof [30], [31], [32].
While existing hardware and software spoof detection
schemes provide a reasonable starting point for solving the
spoof detection problem, current solutions have a plethora
of shortcomings. As noted in [19], [20], [21] most hardware
based approaches can be easily bypassed by developing
very thin spoofs (Fig. 3 (a)), since heartbeat, thermal output,
and blood flow can still be read from the live human skin be-
hind the thin spoof. Additionally, some of the characteristics
(such as odor and heartbeat) acquired by the hardware vary
tremendously amongst different human subjects, making it
very difficult to build an adequate model representative of
all live subjects [19], [20].
Current spoof detection software solutions have their
own limitations. Although the LivDet 2015 competition
4. Several fingerprint vendors have developed hardware spoof de-
tection solutions by employing multispectral imaging, infrared imaging
(useful for sub-dermal finger analysis), and pulse capture to distinguish
live fingers from spoof fingers [13], [14].
5. Raw fingerprint images are “processed” (such as RGB to grayscale
conversion, contrast enhancement, and scaling) by COTS readers to
boost matching performance. However, useful spoof detection informa-
tion (such as color and/or minute textural abberations) is lost during
this processing.
reported state-of-the-art spoof detection software to have an
average accuracy of 95.51% [33], the spoof detection perfor-
mance at desired operating points such as False Detect Rate
(FDR) of 0.1% was not reported, and very limited evaluation
was performed to determine the effects of testing spoof
detectors with spoofs fabricated from materials not seen
during training (cross-material evaluation). In the limited
cross material evaluation that was performed, the rate of
spoofs correctly classified as spoofs was shown to drop from
96.57% to 94.20% [33]. While this slight drop in accuracy
seems promising, without knowing the performance at field
conditions, namely False Detect Rate (FDR)6 of 0.1% on a
larger collection of unknown materials, the reported levels
of total accuracy should be accepted with caution. Chugh
et al. [32] pushed state-of-the-art fingerprint spoof detec-
tion performance on the LivDet 2015 dataset from 95.51%
average accuracy to 98.61% average accuracy using a CNN
trained on patches around minutiae points, but they also
demonstrated that performance at strict operating points
dropped significantly in some experiments. For example,
Chugh et al. reported an average accuracy on the LivDet
2011 dataset of 97.41%, however, at a FDR of 1.0%, the
TDR was only 90.32%, indicating that current state-of-the-
art spoof detection systems leave room for improvement at
desired operating points. Finally, several other studies have
reported up to a three-fold increase in error when testing
spoof detectors on unknown material types [34], [35], [36].
Because of the less than desired performance of spoof
detection software to adapt to spoofs fabricated from unseen
materials, studies in [37], [38], and [39] developed open-
set recognition classifiers to better detect spoofs fabricated
with novel material types. However, while these classifiers
6. The required operating point for the ODIN program supporting
this research is FDR = 0.2%
3Fig. 3. Example spoof fingers and live fingers in our database. (a) Spoof fingers and (b) live fingers used to acquire both spoof fingerprint impressions
and live fingerprint impressions for conducting the experiments reported in this paper. The spoofs in (a) and the live fingers in (b) are not in 1-to-1
correspondence.
are able to generalize to spoofs made with new materials
better than closed-set recognition algorithms, their overall
accuracy (approx. 85% - 90%) still does not meet the desired
performance for field deployments.
Given the limitations of state-of-the-art fingerprint spoof
detection (both in hardware and software), it is evident that
much work remains to be done in developing robust and
generalizable spoof detection solutions. We posit that one of
the biggest limitations facing the most successful spoof de-
tection solutions to date (such as use of textural features [36]
and CNNs [30], [31], [32]), is the processed COTS fingerprint
reader images used to train spoof detectors. In particular,
because COTS fingerprint readers output fingerprint images
which have undergone a number of image processing oper-
ations (in an effort to achieve high matching performance),
they are not optimal for fingerprint spoof detection, since
valuable information such as color and textural aberrations
is lost during the image processing operations. By removing
color and minute textural details from the raw fingerprint
images, spoof fingerprint impressions and live fingerprint
impressions (acquired on COTS optical readers) appear very
similar (Fig. 2 (c)), even when the physical live/spoof fingers
used to collect the respective fingerprint impressions appear
very different (Fig. 3).
This limitation inherent to many existing spoof detec-
tion solutions motivated us to develop a custom, optical
fingerprint reader, called RaspiReader, with the capability
to output 2 raw images (from 2 different cameras) for spoof
detection. By mounting two cameras at appropriate angles
to a glass prism (Fig. 4), one camera is able to capture high
contrast FTIR fingerprint images (useful for both fingerprint
spoof detection and fingerprint matching) (Fig. 2 (ii)), while
the other camera captures direct images of the finger skin
in contact with the platen (useful for fingerprint spoof de-
tection) (Fig. 2 (i)). Both images of the RaspiReader visually
differentiate between live fingers and spoof fingers much
more than the processed fingerprint images output by COTS
fingerprint readers (Fig. 2 (c)).
RaspiReader’s two camera approach is similar to that
which was prescribed by Rowe et al. in [13], [17] where
both an FTIR image and a direct view image were acquired
using different wavelength LEDs, however, the commercial
products developed around the ideas in [13], [17] act as a
proprietary black box outputting only a single processed
composite image of a collection of raw image frames cap-
tured under various wavelengths. As such, fingerprint re-
searchers cannot implement new spoof detection schemes
on the individual raw frames captured by the reader. Fur-
thermore, unlike the patented ideas in [13], RaspiReader is
built with ubiquitous components and open source software
packages, enabling fingerprint researchers to very easily
prototype their own RaspiReader, further customize it with
new spoof detection hardware, and gain direct access to
the raw images captured by the reader. In short, the low
cost ($175 USD) and easy to implement (1 hour build time)
RaspiReader is a truly unique concept which we posit will
push the boundaries of state-of-the-art fingerprint spoof
detection, by facilitating spoof detection schemes which use
both hardware and software.
Experiments demonstrate that by utilizing the two cam-
eras of RaspiReader, we are able to significantly boost the
performance of state-of-the-art spoof detectors previously
trained on COTS grayscale images (both on known-material
and cross-material testing scenarios). In particular, because
both image outputs of the RaspiReader are raw and contain
useful color information, we can extract discriminative and
complementary information from each of the image outputs.
By fusing this complementary information (at a feature
4Fig. 4. Schematic illustrating RaspiReader functionality. Incoming white
light from three LEDs enters the prism. Camera 2 receives light rays
reflected from the fingerprint ridges only (light rays are not reflected back
from the fingerprint valleys due to total internal reflection (TIR)). This
image from Camera 2, with high contrast between ridges and valleys
can be used for both spoof detection and fingerprint matching. Camera 1
receives light rays reflected from both the ridges and valleys. This image
from Camera 1 provides complementary information for spoof detection.
level or score level) the performance of spoof detectors is
significantly higher than when features are extracted from
COTS grayscale images.
Finally, by calibrating and processing the FTIR im-
age output of the RaspiReader (post spoof detection), we
demonstrate that RaspiReader is not only interoperable with
existing COTS optical readers but is also capable of achiev-
ing state-of-the-art fingerprint matching accuracy. Note that
interoperability with existing COTS readers is absolutely
vital in any new hardware based spoof detection solution
as it makes the spoof resistant device compatible (in terms
of matching) with legacy fingerprint databases7. Further-
more, by making the RaspiReader compatible with existing
COTS readers, we further extend the utility of RaspiReader
beyond spoof detection. In particular, RaspiReader is not
only useful for providing direct access to multiple raw
images for spoof detection; it also provides researchers in
fingerprint matching the easy ability to fine tune (resolution
and processing) the images being output by the fingerprint
reader. In any imaging system, the recognition performance
depends on the quality of the image output by the sensor.
7. Interoperability with existing COTS readers is a strict requirement
of the IARPA ODIN program supporting this research [2].
This is particularly true of fingerprint recognition systems.
As shown in the NIST FpVTE 2013 [40] results, the single
most important factor responsible for degrading fingerprint
recognition performance is the fingerprint image quality.
However, most fingerprint researchers have no control over
the quality of the fingerprint images being used to develop
fingerprint recognition algorithms since they must rely on
blackbox COTS fingerprint readers. RaspiReader changes
this by providing fingerprint matching algorithm designers
an easy method for prototyping their own fingerprint reader
and optimizing fingerprint image quality and fingerprint
matching algorithms jointly in an effort to further improve
fingerprint recognition performance.
In summary, our work on RaspiReader removes the mys-
tery of designing and understanding the internals of a fin-
gerprint reader. Using the open-source fabrication process
of this fingerprint reader, any fingerprint algorithm designer
can quickly and affordably construct his or her own reader
with the capabilities (spoof detection and matching image
quality) necessary to meet their application requirements.
More concisely, the contributions of this research are:
• An open source, easy to assemble, cost effective fin-
gerprint reader, called RaspiReader, capable of pro-
ducing fingerprint images useful for spoof detection
and that are of high quality and resolution (1,500 ppi
- 3,300 ppi native resolution) for fingerprint match-
ing. The custom RaspiReader can be easily modified
to facilitate spoof detection and fingerprint matching
studies.
• A customized fingerprint reader with two cameras
for image acquisition rather than a single camera.
Use of two cameras enables robust fingerprint spoof
detection, since we can extract features from two
complementary, information rich images instead of
processed grayscale images output by traditional
COTS optical fingerprint readers.
• A significant boost in spoof detection performance
(both known-material and seven cross-material test-
ing scenarios) using current state-of-the-art software
based spoof detection methods in conjunction with
RaspiReader images as opposed to COTS optical
grayscale images. Spoofs of seven materials were
used in both known-material and cross-material test-
ing scenarios.
• Demonstrated matching interoperability of
RaspiReader with a COTS optical fingerprint reader.
Since RaspiReader is shown to be interoperable with
COTS readers, it could immediately be deployed
in the real world since interoperability makes the
device compatible with legacy fingerprint databases.
2 RASPIREADER CONSTRUCTION AND CALIBRA-
TION
In this section, the construction of the RaspiReader us-
ing ubiquitous, off-the-shelf components (Table 1) is ex-
plained. In particular, the main steps involved in construct-
ing RaspiReader consist of (i) properly mounting cameras
(angle and position) with respect to a glass prism, (ii)
fabricating a plastic case to house the hardware components,
5Table 1: Primary Components Used to Construct RaspiReader. Total Cost is $175.20 (as of December 12, 2017)
Component Image Name and Description Quantity Cost (USD)1
Raspberry Pi 3B: A single board computer (SBC) with 1.2 GHz 64-bit
quad-core CPU, 1 GB RAM, MicroSDHC storage, and Broadcom
VideoCore IV Graphic card
1 $38.27
Raspberry Pi Camera Module V1: A 5.0 megapixel, 30 frames per
second, fixed focal length camera
2 $13.49
Multi-Camera Adapter: Splits Raspberry Pi camera slot into two
slots, enabling connection of two cameras
1 $49.99
LEDs: white light, 5 mm, 1 watt 3 $0.10
Resistors: 1 kΩ 3 $5.16
Right Angle Prism:2 25 mm leg, 35.4 mm hypotenuse 1 $54.50
1 All items except the glass prism were purchased for the listed prices on Amazon.com
2 The glass prism was purchased from ThorLabs [41].
(iii) assembling the cameras and hardware within the plastic
case, and (iv) writing software to capture fingerprint images
with the assembled hardware. Each of these steps is de-
scribed in more detail in the following subsections. Finally,
we provide the steps for calibrating and processing the raw
FTIR fingerprint images of the RaspiReader for fingerprint
matching.
2.1 Camera Placement
The most important step in constructing RaspiReader is
the placement (angle and position) of the two cameras
capturing fingerprint images. In particular, to collect an
FTIR image of a fingerprint, a camera needs to be mounted
at an angle greater than the critical angle, and to collect a
direct view image, a camera needs to be mounted an an
angle less than the critical angle (both with respect to the
platen). Here, the critical angle is defined as the angle at
which total internal reflection occurs when light passes from
a medium with an index of refraction n1 to another medium
with index of refraction n2 (Eq. 1):
θc = arcsin(
n2
n1
) (1)
In the case of fingerprint sensing, the first medium is
glass which has an index of refraction n1 = 1.5, and the
second medium is air which has an index of refraction of
n2 = 1.0 leading to a critical angle (θc) of 41.8◦. Therefore,
as shown in (Fig. 4), we mount the direct view camera
(camera1) at an angle of θ1 = 10◦ and we mount the FTIR
camera (camera2) at an angle of θ2 = 45◦.
With respect to the position of each camera lens to
the glass prism, there is a tradeoff between resolution and
fingerprint area to consider. As the camera is moved closer
to the prism, the fingerprint image resolution (pixels per
inch) is increased. However, if the cameras are too close
to the platen, only part of the fingerprint image is within
the field of view (FOV). In constructing RaspiReader, we
wanted to maximize the fingerprint image resolution, while
still capturing the entire fingerprint image within the FOV.
We experimentally determined that at a distance of 23 mm
from the prism, the cameras would capture the entire finger-
print area. At closer distances, part of the fingerprint image
would start to be outside the FOV. As a final step in camera
placement, the focal length of the Raspicams (cameras used
in RaspiReader) must be increased so that the camera will
focus on the nearby glass prism (the default focus-length
of the Raspicams is 1 meter; much greater than the 23 mm
distant prism). By default, the Raspicams have a fixed-focal
length of 3.6 mm. However, by rotating the Raspicam lens
652.5◦ counterclockwise (for the FTIR imaging camera) and
405◦ counterclockwise (for the direct imaging camera), the
focal length can be slightly increased to bring the nearby
fingerprint images into focus.
2.2 Case Fabrication
After determining the angle and position of both cameras,
an outer casing (Fig. 5) accommodating these positions
is electronically modeled using Meshlab [42] and subse-
quently 3D printed on a high resolution 3D printer (Strata-
sys Objet350 Connex)8. To make the fabrication process
easily reproducible, the camera mounts and light source
mounts are modeled in place on the front part of the
fingerprint reader case (Fig. 6). As such, one only needs to
3D print the open-source STL files and clip the LEDs and
8. We are currently investigating alternative case manufacturing
methods such as CNC milling.
6Raspicams to their respective mounts (Fig. 6) in order to
quickly build their own RaspiReader replica.
Fig. 5. Electronic CAD model of the RaspiReader case. The dimensions
here were provided to a 3D printer for fabricating the prototype.
Fig. 6. Inside view of the RaspiReader case. The camera and LED
mounts are positioned at the necessary angles and distance to the glass
prism, making the reproduction of RaspiReader as simple as 3D printing
the open-sourced STL files.
2.3 Image Acquisition Hardware and Software
The backbone of the RaspiReader is the popular Raspberry
Pi 3B single board computer, which enables easy interfacing
with GPIO pins (for controlling LEDs) and image acqui-
sition (with its standard camera and camera connection
port). Because the Raspberry Pi only has a single camera
connection port, a camera port multiplexer is used to enable
the use of multiple cameras on a single Pi [43]. Using the
Raspberry Pi GPIO pins, the code available in [43], and the
camera multiplexer, one can easily extend the Raspberry Pi
to use multiple cameras.
After assembling the camera port multiplexer to the Pi
(with two Raspicams), wiring 3 LEDs to the Raspberry Pi
GPIO pins, and attaching the Raspicams and LEDs to the 3D
printed casing mounts (Fig. 6), open source python libraries
[43] can be used to illuminate the glass prism and subse-
quently acquire two images (Fig. 2 (a)) from the fingerprint
reader (one raw FTIR fingerprint image and another raw
direct fingerprint image).
2.4 Fingerprint Image Processing
In order for the RaspiReader to be used for spoof detec-
tion, it must also demonstrate the ability to output high
quality fingerprint images suitable for fingerprint matching.
As previously mentioned, the RaspiReader performs spoof
detection on non-processed, raw fingerprint images. While
these raw images are shown to provide discriminatory infor-
mation for spoof detection, they need to be made compatible
with processed images output by other COTS fingerprint
readers. Therefore, after spoof detection, the RaspiReader
performs image processing operations on the raw high
contrast, FTIR image frames in order to output high fidelity
images compatible with COTS optical fingerprint readers.
Let a raw (unprocessed) FTIR fingerprint image from
the RaspiReader be denoted as FTIRraw. This raw image
FTIRraw is first converted from the RGB color space to
grayscale (FTIRgray) (Fig. 9 (a)). Then, in order to fur-
ther contrast the ridges from the valleys of the fingerprint,
histogram equalization is performed on FTIRgray (Fig. 9
(b)). Finally, FTIRgray is negated so that the ridges of the
fingerprint image are dark, and the background of the image
is white (as are fingerprint images acquired from COTS
readers) (Fig. 9 (c)).
Following the aforementioned image processing tech-
niques, the RaspiReader FTIR fingerprint images are further
processed by performing a perspective transformation (to
frontalize the fingerprint to the image plane) and scaling to
500 ppi (Figs. 9 (d), (f)).
A perspective transformation is performed using Equa-
tion 2, x′y′
1
 = 1
λ
a b cd e f
g h 1
xy
1
 (2)
where x and y are the source coordinates, x′ and y′ are
the transformed coordinates, (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) is the set of
transformation parameters, and λ = gx + hy + 1 is a scale
parameter. In this work, we image a 2D printed checker-
board pattern to define source and destination coordinate
pairs such that the transformation parameters could be
estimated (Fig. 7). Once the perspective transformation has
been completed, the RaspiReader image is downsampled
(by averaging neighborhood pixels) to 500 ppi (Fig. 9 (f)).
Note that the native resolution of the RaspiReader images
was acquired using a 2D printed checkerboard calibration
pattern (Fig. 7 (b)) and ranges from approx. 1594 ppi to 2480
ppi in the x-axis (Fig. 8 (a)) and 2463 ppi to 3320 ppi in the
y-axis (Fig. 8 (b)). While the high resolution images captured
by the RaspiReader 5 Megapixel cameras far exceed the
resolution of COTS fingerprint readers (providing added
minute textural details for distinguishing live fingers from
7spoof fingers), we observed that the focus of the native
images captured by RaspiReader does deteriorate on the left
and right edges (Fig. 7 (b)). We are currently investigating
methods for properly focusing the lens on the entire FOV,
so that minute textural details are not lost on the edges of
the RaspiReader images.
Fig. 7. Acquiring Image Transformation Parameters. A 2D printed
checkerboard pattern (a) is imaged by the RaspiReader (b). Corre-
sponding points between the frontalized checkerboard pattern (a) and
the distorted checkerboard pattern (b) are defined so that perspective
transformation parameters can be estimated to map (b) into (c). These
transformation parameters are subsequently used to frontalize finger-
print images acquired by RaspiReader for the purpose of fingerprint
matching. The checkerboard imaged in (b) is also used to acquire the
native resolution of RaspiReader in order to scale matching images to
500 ppi in both the x and y axis as shown in (c).
Upon completion of this entire fingerprint reader assem-
bly and image processing procedure, the RaspiReader is
fully functional and ready for use in both spoof detection
and subsequent fingerprint matching.
3 LIVE AND SPOOF FINGERPRINT DATABASE
CONSTRUCTION
To test the utility of the RaspiReader for spoof detection
and its interoperability for fingerprint matching, a database
of live and spoof fingerprint impressions was collected for
performing experiments. This database is constructed as
follows.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8. Native resolution (ppi) in (a) x-axis and (b) y-axis over the
raw FTIR RaspiReader image. As is normal, native resolution changes
across the image because the right side of the image is closer to the
camera than the left side.
Using 7 different materials (Fig. 3 (a)), 66 spoofs were
fabricated9. Then, for each of these spoofs, 10 impressions
were captured at varying orientations and pressure on both
the RaspiReader (Rpi) and a COTS 500 ppi optical FTIR
9. Our spoofs were shipped to us by Precise Biometrics [44], a
company specializing in evaluating spoof detection capability and that
also has close ties to the LivDet dataset authors. As such, our spoofs
are of high quality and are similar to the spoofs used in the LivDet
competition.
8Fig. 9. Processing a RaspiReader raw FTIR fingerprint image into a 500 ppi fingerprint image compatible for matching with existing COTS fingerprint
readers. (a) The RGB raw FTIR image is first converted to grayscale. (b) Histogram equalization is performed on the grayscale FTIR image to
enhance the contrast between the fingerprint ridges and valleys. (c) The fingerprint is negated so that the ridges appear dark, and the valleys
appear white. (d), (f) Calibration (estimated using the checkerboard calibration pattern in (e)) is applied to frontalize the fingerprint image to the
image plane and down sample (by averaging neighborhood pixels) to 500 ppi in both the x and y directions.
fingerprint reader (COTSA). The summary of this data
collection is enumerated in Table 2.
To collect a sufficient variety of live finger data, we
enlisted 15 human subjects with different skin colors (Fig.
3 (b)). Each of these subjects gave 5 finger impressions (at
different orientations and pressures) from all 10 of their
fingers on both the RaspiReader andCOTSA 10. A summary
of this data collection is enumerated in Table 3.
Table 2: Summary of Spoof1 Fingerprints Collected
Material
Number
of
Spoofs2
RPi Direct
Images
RPi FTIR
Images
COTSA
FTIR
Images
Ecoflex 10 100 100 100
Wood Glue 10 100 100 100
Monster Liquid
Latex 10 100 100 100
Liquid Latex
Body Paint 10 100 100 100
Gelatin 10 100 100 100
Silver Coated
Ecoflex 10 100 100 100
Crayola Model
Magic 6 60 60 60
Total 66 660 660 660
1 The spoof materials used to fabricate these spoofs were in accordance
with the approved materials by the IARPA ODIN project [2].
2 The spoofs are all of unique fingerprint patterns.
Table 3: Summary of Live Finger Data Collected
Number of
Subjects
Number of
Fingers
RPi Direct
Images
RPi FTIR
Images
COTSA
FTIR
Images
15 150 750 750 750
10. Acquiring a fingerprint on RaspiReader involves the same user
interactions that a COTS optical reader does. A user simply places
their finger on a glass prism. Then, LEDs illuminate the finger surface
and images are captured from both cameras over a time period of 1.5
seconds (Fig. 1). The only difference in the acquisition process between
a COTS reader and RaspiReader is that RaspiReader acquires two
complementary images of the finger in contact with the glass platen
from two separately mounted cameras.
In addition to the images of live finger impressions and
spoof finger impressions we collected for conducting spoof
detection experiments, we also verified that for spoofs with
optical properties too far from that of live finger skin (Fig.
10), images would not be captured by the RaspiReader.
These “failure to capture” spoofs are therefore filtered out as
attacks before any software based spoof detection methods
need to be performed.
Fig. 10. Failure to Capture. Several spoofs are unable to be imaged by
the RaspiReader due to their dissimilarity in color. In particular, because
spoofs in (a) and (b) are black, all light rays will be absorbed preventing
light rays from reflecting back to the FTIR imaging sensor. In (c), the
dark blue color again prevents enough light from reflecting back to the
camera. (a) and (b) are both ecoflex spoofs coated with two different
conductive coatings. (c) is a blue crayola model magic spoof attack.
4 SPOOF DETECTION EXPERIMENTS AND RE-
SULTS
Given the database of live and spoof fingerprint images
collected on both COTSA, and the prototype RaspiReader,
a number of spoof detection experiments are conducted
to demonstrate the superiority of the raw images from
the RaspiReader for training spoof detectors in comparison
to the grayscale images output by COTS optical readers.
In particular, we (i) take several successful spoof detec-
tion techniques from the literature, (ii) train and test the
9spoof detectors on COTSA images, (iii) train and test the
spoof detectors on RaspiReader images, and (iv) compare
the results to show the significant boost in performance
when RaspiReader images are used to train spoof detectors
rather than COTSA images. In addition, experiments are
conducted to demonstrate that fingerprint images from the
RaspiReader are compatible for matching with fingerprint
images acquired from COTSA.
4.1 Spoof Detection Methods
To thoroughly demonstrate the value RaspiReader images
provide in training spoof detectors, we select two different
spoof detection methods, namely, (i) textural features (LBP
[45]) in conjunction with a linear Support Vector Machine
(SVM) and (ii) a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN).
Textural features were chosen because of their popularity
and their demonstrated superior spoof detection perfor-
mance in comparison to other “hand-crafted features” such
as anatomical or physiological features in the literature [36].
CNNs were chosen as a second spoof detection method in
our experiments given that they are currently state-of-the-
art on the publicly available LivDet datasets. [30], [31], [32],
[45]. The details of the experiments performed with both of
these spoof detection methods are provided in the following
subsections.
4.1.1 LBP Features From COTSA Images
We begin our experiments using grayscale processed finger-
print images acquired from COTSA (Fig. 2 (c)). From these
images, we extract the very prevalent grayscale and rotation
invariant local binary patterns (LBP) [45]. LBP features are
extracted by constructing a histogram of bit string values de-
termined by thresholding pixels in the local neighborhoods
around each pixel in the image. Since image texture can be
observed at different spatial resolutions, parameters R and
P are specified in LBP construction to indicate the length
(in pixels) of the neighborhood radius used for selecting
pixels and also the number of neighbors to consider in
a local neighborhood. Previous studies have shown that
more than 90% of fundamental textures in an image can
belong to a small subset of binary patterns called “uniform”
textures (local binary patterns containing two or fewer 0/1
bit transitions) [45]. Therefore, in line with previous studies
using local binary patterns for fingerprint spoof detection,
we also employ the use of uniform local binary patterns.
More formally, let LBP (P,R) be the uniform local bi-
nary pattern histogram constructed by binning the local
binary patterns for each pixel in an image according to
the well known LBP operation [45] with parameters P and
R. In our experiments, we extract LBP (8, 1), LBP (16, 2),
and LBP (24, 3) in order to capture textures at different
spatial resolutions. These histograms (each having P + 2
bins) are individually normalized and concatenated into a
single feature vector X of dimension 54.
For classification of these features, we employ a binary
linear SVM. As known in the art, an initially “hard margin”
SVM can be “softened” by a parameter C to enable better
generalization of the classifier to the testing dataset. In our
case, we use five-fold cross validation to select the value of
C (from the list of
[
10−5 10−4 ... 104 105
]
) such that
the best performance is achieved in different folds. In our
experiments, the best classification results were achieved
with C = 102.
4.1.2 CLBP Features From RaspiReader Images
In this experiment, we make use of the information rich
images from the RaspiReader (Figs. 2 (a, b)) for spoof detec-
tion. As with Experiment 1, we again pursue the use of LBP
textural features. However, since the raw images from the
RaspiReader contain color information, rather than using
the traditional grayscale LBP features, we employ the use
of color local binary patterns (CLBP). Previous works have
shown the efficacy of CLBP for both face recognition and
face spoof detection [46], [47]. However, because fingerprint
images from COTS fingerprint readers are grayscale, CLBP
features have, to our knowledge, not been investigated for
use in fingerprint spoof detection until now.
Unlike traditional grayscale LBP patterns, color local
binary patterns (CLBP) encode discriminative spatiochro-
matic textures from across multiple spectral channels [46]. In
other words, CLBP extracts textures across all the different
image bands in a given input image. More formally, given
an input image I with K spectral channels, let the set of
all spectral channels for I be defined as S = {S1, ..., SK}.
Then, the CLBP feature vector X of dimension 486 can be
extracted from I using Algorithm 1. Note that in Algorithm
1, LBP (Si, Sj , P,R) returns a normalized histogram of
local binary patterns using Si as the image channel that
the center (thresholding) pixels are selected from, and Sj
as the image channel from which the neighborhood pixels
are selected from in the same computation of LBP as per-
formed in Experiment 1. Also note that in Algorithm 1, ‖
indicates vector concatenation. Finally, in our experiments,
we preprocess the RaspiReader input image I prior to CLBP
extraction by (i) downsampling (FTIR images from 1450 x
1944 to 108 x 145 and direct view images from 1290 x 1944
to 96 x 145), and (ii) converting to the HSV color space (Fig.
11)11.
Algorithm 1 Extraction of Color Local Binary Patterns
X← [ ]
for i← 1,K do
for j ← 1,K do
X← X‖LBP (Si, Sj , 8, 1)‖
LBP (Si, Sj , 16, 2)‖LBP (Si, Sj , 24, 3)
end for
end for
return X
As in Experiment 1, a binary linear SVM with a pa-
rameter of C = 102 is trained with these features and
subsequently used for classification. We again choose the
parameter C using 5-fold cross validation and a selec-
tion list of
[
10−5 10−4 ... 104 105
]
. Since RaspiReader
outputs two color images (one raw FTIR image and one
direct view image), we perform multiple experiments us-
ing the proposed CLBP features in conjunction with the
11. Other color spaces were experimented with, but HSV consistently
provided the highest performance. This is likely because HSV separates
the luminance and chrominance components in an image, allowing
extraction of features on more complementary image channels.
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SVM. In particular, we (i) extract CLBP features from the
RaspiReader raw FTIR images to train/test a SVM, (ii)
extract CLBP features from RaspiReader direct view images
to train/test a SVM, and (iii) fuse CLBP features from both
image outputs to train and test a SVM. We also attempted
fusing CLBP features from the RaspiReader raw images
with grayscale LBP features from RaspiReader processed
FTIR images, but found no significant performance gains
under this last fusion scheme.
Fig. 11. RGB to HSV conversion. (a) A live direct view image from
RaspiReader is converted to the HSV color space. (b) An ecoflex spoof
attack imaged by the direct view camera of RaspiReader is converted to
the HSV color space. Experimental results demonstrate a performance
boost when preprocessing the RaspiReader images by converting from
the RGB to HSV color space.
4.1.3 MobileNet
In addition to performing experiments involving “hand-
crafted” textural features, we also perform experiments
where the features are directly learned and classified by a
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). In choosing a CNN
architecture, we carefully considered both the size and com-
putational overhead, since in future works, we will optimize
the architecture to directly run on the RaspiReader’s Rasp-
berry Pi Processor. The need for a “low over-head” architec-
ture prompted us to select MobileNet [48]. MobileNet has
been shown to perform very closely (within 1 % accuracy)
to popular CNN models (VGG and Inception v3) on the
ImageNet and Stanford Dogs datasets while being 32 times
smaller than VGG, 7 times smaller than Inception v3, 27
times less computationally expensive than VGG, and 8 times
less computationally expensive than Inception v3.
In our experiments, we employ the Tensorflow Slim
implementation of MobileNet12. MobileNet is comprised
of 28 convolutional layers, and in our case, a final 2 class
softmax layer for classification of live or spoof. In all of our
experiments involving MobileNet, the RMSProp optimizer
was used for training the network along with a batch size
of 32, and an adaptive (exponential decay) learning rate. To
increase the generalization ability of the networks, we em-
ploy various data augmentation methods such as brightness
adjustment, random cropping, and horizontal and vertical
reflections.
Using the aforementioned MobileNet architecture and
hyper-parameters, we train/test the network with (i)
COTSA grayscale fingerprint images, (ii) RaspiReader raw
FTIR images, (iii) RaspiReader direct view images, and
(iv) RaspiReader processed FTIR images. Additionally, we
perform experiments in which we fuse the score outputs of
MobileNet models trained on the different image outputs
from RaspiReader to take advantage of the complementary
information within the different RaspiReader image out-
puts. When training and testing MobileNet with COTSA
images or RaspiReader processed FTIR images, the three
input channels of the network are each fed with the same
down sampled (357 x 392 to 224 x 224) grayscale COTSA
image or (290 x 267 to 224 x 224) RaspiReader processed
FTIR image. When training the network with RaspiReader
raw images, we again down sample the images (1450 x
1944 to 224 x 224 for raw FTIR and 1290 x 1944 to 224
x 224 for direct image), however, in this case, each of the
three color channels are fed as input to the three input
channels of the network. More specifically, we first convert
the RaspiReader image to HSV (given our earlier findings
of superior performance in this color space), and then feed
each channel H, S, and V into the network’s input channels.
4.2 Spoof Detection Results
Using the spoof detection schemas previously described, we
train and test classifiers under two main scenarios. In the
first scenario, we train the classifier on a subset of spoof
images from every type in the dataset (Table 2). During
testing, spoof images from the same spoof types seen during
training will be passed to the spoof detector for classifica-
tion. We hereafter refer to this training and testing scenario
as a “known-material” scenario. In the second scenario,
we train the classifier with images from all of the spoof
types in the dataset except one (i.e. the spoof impressions
from one type of spoof are withheld). Then, during test-
ing the impressions of the withheld spoof type are used
for testing. In the literature, this type of spoof detection
evaluation is referred to as a “cross-material” scenario. In
the following experimental results, we demonstrate that the
RaspiReader images significantly boost the spoof detection
12. https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/
slim
11
performance in both the known-material evaluations and
the cross-material evaluations.
4.2.1 Known-Material Scenarios
The first known-material results are reported in accor-
dance with spoof detection methods 1 and 2. That is, we
extract textural features from both COTSA images and
RaspiReader images respectively, train and test linear SVMs,
and finally, compare the results (Table 4). In all of our
known-material scenario experiments, we report the aver-
age spoof detection performance and standard deviation
over 5-folds. That is, for spoof data, we select 80% of the
spoof impressions from each spoof material for training
(each fold) and use the remaining 20% for testing. For live
finger data, we select the finger impressions of 12 subjects
each fold (600 total images) for training, and use the live
finger impressions of the remaining 3 subjects for testing.
Table 4: Textural Features and Known Testing Materials
Method TDR @ FDR = 1.0%
µ± σ1 Detection Time (msecs)
COTSA
+ LBP 75.9%± 30.8 236
Rpi raw FTIR
+ CLBP 91.5%± 11.0 243
Rpi Direct
+ CLBP 98.10%± 1.9 243
Rpi Fusion
+ CLBP2 97.7%± 3.0 486
1 These results are reported over 5-folds.
2 Rpi Fusion + CLBP is a feature level fusion (concatenation) of
CLBP features extracted from both Rpi raw FTIR images and Rpi
Direct Images, respectively.
From the results of Table 4, one can observe that both
image outputs of the RaspiReader contain far more discrim-
inative information for spoof detection than the processed
grayscale images output by COTSA. In particular, spoof
detection performance is significantly higher when extract-
ing textural (CLBP) features from the RaspiReader images,
than when extracting textural features (LBP) from COTSA
images. While in these first results, the fusion of features
from both RaspiReader image outputs actually hurts the
classification performance slightly (compared to extracting
features only from the direct view images), in subsequent
experiments, we will demonstrate that different feature
extraction and classification techniques can better utilize
the multiple outputs of RaspiReader in a complementary
manner to instead boost the classification performance.
The second known-material results are reported in ac-
cordance with spoof detection scheme 3. More specifically,
the results are reported (over 5-folds) when MobileNet is
trained and tested with (i) COTSA images, (ii) RaspiReader
processed FTIR images, (iii) RaspiReader raw FTIR images,
and (iv) RaspiReader direct images. In addition, we report
the results when fusing the score outputs of multiple Mo-
bileNet models trained on the different image outputs of
RaspiReader (Table 5).
The results of Table 5 show that both the raw image
outputs of RaspiReader and the processed image output
of RaspiReader contain more discriminative information
for spoof detection than the processed images output by
COTSA. The MobileNet models trained on RaspiReader
images always outperform the MobileNet model trained on
Table 5: MobileNet and Known Testing Materials
Method TDR @ FDR = 1.0%
µ± σ1 Detection Time (msecs)
COTSA
+ MobileNet 91.9%± 8.0 22
Rpi processed FTIR
+ MobileNet 94.5%± 3.7 22
Rpi raw FTIR
+ MobileNet 95.1%± 5.6 22
Rpi Direct
+ MobileNet 95.3%± 3.5 22
Rpi Fusion 2
+ MobileNet2 98.4%± 2.3 45
Rpi Fusion 3
+ MobileNet3 98.9%± 1.5 67
1 These results are reported over 5-folds.
2 Rpi Fusion 2 + MobileNet is a score level fusion (averaging) of a
MobileNet model trained on Rpi raw FTIR images and a MobileNet model
trained on Rpi Direct Images.
3 Rpi Fusion 3 + MobileNet is a score level fusion (averaging) of separate
MobileNet models trained on Rpi raw FTIR images, Rpi Direct Images,
and on Rpi processed FTIR images.
COTSA grayscale images both in average spoof detection
performance and stability (significantly lower s.d.). What
is further interesting about the results of Table 5 is that the
features extracted by MobileNet from each RaspiReader out-
put are quite complementary, demonstrated by the fact that
spoof detection performance is improved when fusing the
scores of MobileNet models trained on each RaspiReader
image output. So, while CLBP features outperform Mo-
bileNet on the RaspiReader direct images, the fused Mo-
bileNet classifiers outperform the fused CLBP classifier.
4.2.2 Cross-Material Scenarios
The cross-material results use the same spoof detection
schemas as enumerated in the known-material results with a
primary difference being the training and testing data splits
provided to the various classifiers. In all the cross-material
scenarios, spoof impressions of six materials are partitioned
to the classifier for training, and the spoof impressions of
one “unseen” material are kept aside for testing. In this
manner the generalization capability of the spoof detector
to novel spoof types is thoroughly assessed. For live finger
data, we randomly select the finger impressions of two
subjects (100 total images) for testing, and use the live finger
impressions of the remaining thirteen subjects for training.
Since there are seven different spoof materials in our train-
ing set (Table 2), we conduct seven different cross-material
experiments for each spoof detection schema (where one of
the seven spoof types is left aside for testing). The cross
material results when using textural features in conjunction
with SVMs is reported in Table 6. The cross-material results
when using MobileNet extracted features is reported in
Table 7. Note, we only report the best textural fusion and
CNN fusion methods in the cross-material results. The other
non-fusion based methods were experimented with, but did
not provide as high of performance in the cross-material
scenarios.
The key findings of the cross-material experiments as re-
vealed in Tables 6 and 7 are as follows. First, in both textural
based spoof detection methods and CNN based spoof detec-
tion methods, the raw images output by RaspiReader pro-
vide more discriminative information than COTS grayscale
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Table 6: Textural Features and Cross-Material Testing1
Testing Material COTSA+ LBP Rpi Fusion + CLBP
2
Crayola Model
Magic 91.7% 98.3%
Ecoflex 66.0% 77.0%
Silver Coated
Ecoflex 88.0% 100.0%
Gelatin 62.0% 87.0%
Liquid Latex
Body Paint 84.0% 100.0%
Monster Liquid
Latex 68.0% 98.0%
Wood Glue 100.0% 81.0%
1 TDR @ FDR = 1.0% is reported
2 Rpi Fusion + CLBP is a feature level fusion (concatenta-
tion) of CLBP features extracted from both Rpi raw FTIR
images and Rpi Direct Images, respectively.
Table 7: MobileNet and Cross-Material Testing1
Testing Material COTSA+ MobileNet
Rpi
Fusion 2 +
MobileNet2
Rpi
Fusion 3 +
MobileNet3
Crayola Model
Magic 50.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Ecoflex 100.0% 8.0% 56.0%
Silver Coated
Ecoflex 77.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Gelatin 88.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Liquid Latex
Body Paint 97.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Monster Liquid
Latex 86.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Wood Glue 94.0% 96.0% 96.0%
1 TDR @ FDR = 1.0% is reported
2 Rpi Fusion 2 + MobileNet is a score level fusion (max) of
separate MobileNet models trained on Rpi raw FTIR images and
on Rpi Direct Images, respectively.
3 Rpi Fusion 3 + MobileNet is a score level fusion (max) of
separate MobileNet models trained on Rpi raw FTIR images, Rpi
Direct Images, and on Rpi processed FTIR images.
fingerprint images. This enables much higher spoof detec-
tion performance on spoofs fabricated from materials not
seen by the classifier during training, a major flaw in many
existing spoof detection methods relying on only COTS
grayscale images.
The one case of poor cross-material performance (when
using RaspiReader images) came when the testing material
withheld was ecoflex (Table 7). This can be explained by
ecoflex being a very transparent spoof, enabling much of the
live finger color behind the spoof to seep through. As such,
when the MobileNet models were trained on the other non-
transparent spoofs and tested on the transparent ecoflex, the
performance dropped considerably. However, we also no-
ticed that the best cross-material performance (when using
COTSA images) came when the testing material withheld
was ecoflex. The most plausible explanation for this is that
the MobileNet model trained on the COTSA images must
focus on textural features rather than color. As such, the
transparent property of ecoflex did not affect the classifier
trained on the grayscale images. This prompted us to train a
third model on the RaspiReader processed FTIR images (i.e.
the raw FTIR images were converted to grayscale and con-
trast enhanced). We then fused the score of this third model
with the two MobileNet models trained on the RaspiReader
raw FTIR and direct images respectively. The final product
was a three CNN model system which performed much
better on the ecoflex testing scenario (48% improvement).
While the ecoflex testing scenario is still low, in a real world
setting, this limitation is easily solved by including one
transparent spoof in the training set (evidenced by the fact
that in the known-material experiments, ecoflex could be
differentiated from live fingers with high accuracy).
5 INTEROPERABILITY OF RASPIREADER
In addition to demonstrating the usefulness of the
RaspiReader images for fingerprint spoof detection, we also
demonstrate that by processing the RaspiReader FTIR im-
ages, we can output images which are compatible for match-
ing with images from COTS fingerprint readers. Previously,
we discussed how to process and transform a RaspiReader
raw FTIR image into an image suitable for matching. In
this experiment, we evaluate the matching performance (of
11,175 imposter pairs and 6,750 genuine pairs) when using
(i) the RaspiReader processed images as both the enrollment
and probe images, (ii) the COTSA images as both the
enrollment and probe images, and (iii) the COTSA images
as the enrollment images and the RaspiReader processed
images as the probe images. The results for these matching
experiments are listed in Table 8.
Table 8: Fingerprint Matching Results1
Enrollment Reader Probe Reader TAR @ FAR = 0.1%
COTSA COTSA 98.62%
RaspiReader RaspiReader 99.21%
COTSA RaspiReader 95.56%
1 We use the Innovatrics fingerprint SDK which is shown to
have high accuracy in the NIST FpVTE evaluation [40].
From these results, we make two observations. First, the
best performance is achieved for native comparisons, where
the enrolled and search (probe) images are produced by
the same capture device. RaspiReader’s native performance
is slightly better than that of COTSA. This indicates that
the RaspiReader is capable of outputting images which
are compatible with state of the art fingerprint matchers.
Second, we note that the performance does drop slightly
when conducting the interoperability experiment (COTSA
is used for enrollment images and RaspiReader is used for
probe images). However, the matching performance is still
quite high considering the stringent operating point (FAR =
0.1%). Furthermore, studies have shown that when different
fingerprint readers are used for enrollment and subsequent
verification or identification, the matching performance in-
deed drops [49], [50], [51]. Finally, we are currently investi-
gating other approaches for processing and downsampling
RaspiReader images to reduce some of the drop in cross-
reader performance.
6 COMPUTATIONAL RESOURCES
All image preprocessing, LBP and CLBP feature extractions,
and SVM classifications were performed with a single CPU
core on a Macbook Pro running a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 pro-
cessor. MobileNet training and classification was performed
on a single Nvidia GTX Titan GPU. The total time from
image capture to spoof detection with our best MobileNet
model (RpiFusion3) is approximately 3.067 seconds (1.5
13
seconds for image capture, 1.5 seconds to transmit data to
GPU, and 67 milliseconds for classification). In the future,
we will port all spoof detection and fingerprint matching
onto the RaspiReader creating a completely portable and
secure “fingerprint match on box”.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We have open sourced13, the design and assembly of a cus-
tom fingerprint reader, called RaspiReader, with Raspberry
Pi and other ubiquitous components. This fingerprint reader
is both low cost (US $175) and easy to assemble, enabling
other researchers to easily and seamlessly develop their
own novel fingerprint spoof detection solutions which use
both hardware and software. By customizing RaspiReader
with two cameras for fingerprint image acquisition rather
than the customary one, we were able to extract discrim-
inative information from both raw images which, when
fused together, enabled us to achieve higher spoof detection
performance (in both known-material and cross-material
testing scenarios) compared to when features were extracted
from COTS grayscale images. Finally, by processing the raw
FTIR images of the RaspiReader, we were able to output
fingerprint images compatible for matching with COTS op-
tical fingerprint readers demonstrating the interoperability
of RaspiReader.
In our ongoing work, we plan to integrate special-
ized hardware into RaspiReader such as Optical Coher-
ence Tomography (OCT) for sub-dermal imagery, IR cam-
eras for vein detection, or microscopes for capturing ex-
tremely high resolution images of the fingerprint. Because
the RaspiReader uses ubiquitous components running open
source software, RaspiReader enables future integration of
these additional hardware components. In addition to the
integration of specialized hardware, we also plan to use
the raw, information rich images from the RaspiReader
to pursue one-class classification schemes for fingerprint
spoof detection. In particular, we posit that the RaspiReader
images will assist us in modeling the class of live fingerprint
images, such that spoofs of all material types can be easily
rejected. Finally, we will make RaspiReader a self contained
fingerprint recognition system (similar to “match on card
[52]”), so that fingerprint image acquisition, spoof detection,
feature extraction, and matching can all be accomplished
inside RaspiReader. This will provide an entire, portable,
secure “fingerprint match in a box” on an approximately 4
inch cube.
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